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Pridnestrovie, a de facto state within the territory of the Republic of Moldova, 
declared itself independent in September 1990, a declaration that was followed by 
an armed conflict between Moldova and Pridnestrovie in 1992. To date no settlement 
has been achieved between the conflicting parties. The situation is complicated by 
the fact that the Soviet Union and subsequently the Russian Federation has been 
involved in the conflict in various ways. This article seeks to analyse the conflict 
from an international humanitarian law perspective. The involvement of the Soviet 
Union and the Russian Federation in the conflict is of great significance because 
third-party involvement, depending on the level of involvement, has the potential to 
change the categorisation of a conflict from a non-international armed conflict to an 
international armed conflict. This in turn impacts on the number and nature of 
international humanitarian law provisions applicable to the conflict situation. As 
international humanitarian law provides protection to those fighting in and those 
caught up in a conflict, it is important to investigate which international humanitarian 
law provisions could be applicable. The article offers an assessment of the 
categorisation of the Pridnestrovian conflict, focusing on the role of the Soviet Union 
and Russian Federation, and the consequent implications for the application of 
international humanitarian law. 
 
 
                                                 
1 There are a number of names used to refer to the de facto state. Pridnestrovie is used throughout 
the article, but when quoting others, the names used in those quotes are given. These include 
Transdniester and the MRT (Moldavian Republic of Transnistria). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Pridnestrovie, a de facto state within the territory of the Republic of Moldova, 
declared itself independent in September 1990. It now claims a multi-ethnic 
population of over half a million, and an area twice the size of Luxembourg. It holds 
regular elections, has a de facto elected government and engages in international 
trade.2 Pridnestrovie’s territory lies between the river Dniester and the Ukrainian 
border; a long thin sliver of land that was the heart of the economy of the Moldovan 
Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) and home to the 14th Division of the Soviet 
Army.3 Pridnestrovie won its independence through an armed conflict that claimed 
approximately 1,000 victims, and displaced up to 100,000 people in 1992.4 Tensions 
had arisen in 1990 between Moldovan nationalists and pro-Soviet retentionists, who 
were mainly of Russian and Ukrainian origin. Although the main parties to the 
conflict are Moldova and Pridnestrovie, the Moscow-based government, first of the 
Soviet Union and subsequently of the Russian Federation, has also been involved. 
This article examines the role of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation in the 
Pridnestrovian conflict and assesses the implications of this involvement from an 
international humanitarian law (IHL) perspective. The article seeks to ascertain 
whether Moscow’s involvement in the conflict can be adjudged to have transformed 
the conflict from a non-international armed conflict to an international armed 
conflict, and how this impacts on the application of IHL, otherwise know as the laws 
of war, to this conflict. IHL provides protection to those fighting in and those caught 
up in armed conflicts. However, different provisions, providing a higher level of 
protection, are applicable to international armed conflicts than are applicable to non-
international armed conflicts. Therefore, it is important first of all that it be 
                                                 
2 See http://www.pridnestrovie.net (16 October 2008). This website is one of a small number of pro- 
Pridnestrovian websites that appear to support the ‘government’ position. Radio Free Europe describes 
the emergence of English-language websites as a ‘charm offensive’ being undertaken by Pridnestrovie. 
See Luke Allnutt, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, ‘Moldova: in Cyberspace, Transdniester doesn’t 
look that bad’, 15 September 2006, available at 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/09/794de55df342– 
4f9d-8f1a-534a6ea58b78.html (26 March 2008). 
3 Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: the disintegrtaion of 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford, 1996), 358–9. 
4 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘Transnistrian conflict: origins and 
main issues’, 1, available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/mm/1994/06/455_en.pdf (26 March 
2008). 
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determined if a conflict is international or non-international, and second that IHL be 
practically implemented in order to provide protection for individuals living in a 
region in which a conflict is ongoing, such as Pridnestrovie. Part 1 of this article 
describes the potentially applicable IHL regime and Part 2 describes the 
Pridnestrovian conflict, with a focus on Moscow’s role in it. The article concludes 
with a determination of the implications of Soviet Union and Russian Federation 
involvement in the conflict from an IHL perspective. 
 
PART 1—THE IHL REGIME 
Does a conflict situation still exist in Pridnestrovie? 
IHL only applies in time of ‘armed conflict’, and therefore the first issue in this 
discussion must be to determine if an armed conflict exists in the Pridnestrovian 
region. The Tadiç Appeals Chamber Decision before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia gave a definition of armed conflict that has 
implications for determining whether an armed conflict exists in Pridnestrovie. This 
decision states that 
 …an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
 States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
 organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International 
 humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends 
 beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; 
 or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that 
 moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory 
 of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under 
 the control of a party,  whether or not actual combat takes place there.5 
 
Al though the confl ic t  in  quest ion  could  be  regarded as  a  f rozen confl ic t ,  as 
hostilities subsided in 1992, the Tadiç decision definition would appear to include the 
conflict between Moldova and Pridnestrovie as an ‘armed conflict’, as there was a 
protracted armed conflict between a government authority (Moldova) and an organised 
armed group (Pridnestrovie) but a peaceful settlement has not yet been achieved. This 
suggests that IHL should apply in the Pridnestrovian region, as it is stated in Tadiç that 
IHL extends ?beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is 
reached? or until ?a peaceful settlement is achieved’.6  While there have been a number 
                                                 
5 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter cited as ICTY), Tadiç Appeals 
Chamber Decision, Paragraph 70. 
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of initiatives attempting to bring peace to Pridnestrovie, they have failed, and indeed 
Russian troops are still present in the region in a peacekeeping capacity. Pridnestrovie 
has undertaken a state-building initiative, while having no recognition from the 
international community as a state, and little prospect of gaining such recognition, and 
its Republican Guard has been growing stronger. Were Russian peacekeeping troops 
to withdraw a return to conflict could certainly be possible. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that an armed conflict situation existed and continues to exist in the 
Pridnestrovian region and that IHL should apply. It is now necessary to determine the 
categorisat ion of this  confl ic t  and,  if  Moscow’s involvement  impacts  on this 
categorisation, to see the potential extent of the application of IHL in the region. 
 
The categorisation of armed conflicts under IHL 
IHL applies to two categories of armed conflicts: international armed conflicts and 
non-international armed conflicts ,  but does not apply  to situations of internal 
disturbance.7  The primary documents of IHL are the Geneva Conventions, which 
were adopted in 1949, and their Additional Protocols, which were adopted in 1977. 
The conventions have been ratified by nearly every state in the world,8  but they have 
also gained recognition as part of customary law, which means that they apply in all 
conflict situations, regardless of their ratification. The Additional Protocols are less 
widely ratified,9 but certain aspects of these instruments have also been recognised 
as being part of customary law.10 The four Conventions, focusing on the wounded 
and sick on land11 and at sea,12 prisoners of war13 and civilians,14 were adopted in the  
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Tadiç Appeals Chamber Decision, Paragraph 70. 
7 See article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. See also Dietrich 
Schlindler, ‘The different types of armed conflicts according to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols’ 
163 Recueil des Cours II (1979), 116–63: 126. 
8 There are 194 High Contracting Parties, as of March 2008. 
9 Additional Protocol I has 167 High Contracting Parties and Additional Protocol II has 163 High 
Contracting Parties, as of March 2008. 
10 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law (2 vols, Cambridge and Geneva, 2005). 
11 Geneva Convention I, 1949, for the ‘Amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in 
armed forces in the field’ (hereafter cited as Convention I); the text of the convention is available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/fe20c3d903ce27e3c125641e004a9 
2f3 (16 October 2008). 
12 Geneva Convention II, 1949, for the ‘Amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea’ (hereafter cited as Convention II); the text of this convention 
is available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/4407 
2487ec4c2131c125641e004a9977 (16 October 2008). 
13 Geneva Convention III, 1949, relative to the ‘Treatment of prisoners of war’; available at: 
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aftermath of World War II and apply to conflicts of an international character, i.e. 
conflicts between two High Contracting Parties. In 1949 intra-state conflicts were a 
lot less common than inter-state conflicts and there is but one provision in the 
conventions that extends the scope of protection to those involved in and caught up 
in conflicts of a non-international character—Common Article 3,15  which provides 
only a minimum and very basic level of protection to those caught up in non-international 
armed conflicts. Obviously, the present state of IHL does not adequately reflect the  
current predominance of non-international armed conflicts, which can only be to the  
detriment of those fighting in and caught up such conflicts as the protection on offer to  
them is a lot les than that provided for those in an international armed conflict situation.   
If a conflict is categorised as international, then all c. 400 articles of the Conventions  
apply. However, if a conflict is considered to be a non-international conflict, it is  
only the ‘rudimentary rules’16 of Common Article 3 that apply. 
 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions also applies to international armed 
conflicts between High Contracting Parties, while Additional Protocol II applies to 
non-international armed conflicts taking place on the territory of a High Contracting 
Party to the Protocol. The USSR was a state party to the Geneva Conventions, 
including Additional Protocols I  and II ,  and Moldova is now a state party  by 
succession.17  There have been a number of calls in recent years for the amendment 
of IHL by means of abandoning the division between international armed conflicts 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e 
68 (16 October 2008). 
14 Geneva Convention IV, 1949, relative to the ‘Protection of civilian persons in time of war’; 
available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6756482d86146898c 
125641e004aa3c5 (16 October 2008). 
15 Regarding the Geneva Conventions and Common Article 2, Rwelamira comments: ‘The only 
mitigation to this rigorous provision was mildly provided for in common Article 3, which specified 
certain minimum standards to be applied in internal conflicts, i.e. wars of non-international character. 
Common Article 3 required parties to the conflict to be guided by considerations of humanity towards 
each other’, see Medard R. Rwelamira, ‘The significance and contribution of the Protocols Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949’, in Jean Pictet and Christophe Swinarski (eds), Etudes et 
essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge - en honneur de Jean 
Pictet, (The Netherlands, 1984), 227–36, 230. 
16 Dietrich Schlindler, ‘The different types of armed conflicts according to the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocols’, 163 Recueil des Cours II (1979), 116–63: 126. 
17 Moldova ratified both Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II in 1993, however, they had 
already been ratified by the Soviet Union in 1989 and ‘All the States, including Russia, which are former 
members of the USSR, have assumed by succession the obligation to apply the Additional Protocols in 
their territory in the event of an armed conflict’; see Igor Blishchenko, ‘Adoption of the 1977 Additional 
Protocols’, International Review of the Red Cross (320) 1977, 511–14, available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNV3 (26 March 2008). 
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and non-international armed conflicts,18 but the division remains in place. For the 
purposes  of  th is  ar t ic le  the v i ta l  quest ion is  whether  Moscow’s involvement 
transformed the Pridnestrovian conflict into an international armed conflict, thus 
potentially triggering the application of the whole corpus of IHL and providing more 
protection for people living in the Pridnestrovian region. 
 
It is all the more important that a legal regime, and moreover an expansive legal 
regime, be deemed to be applicable and indeed actually applied in areas such as 
Pridnestrovie because, as it is a de facto state, the same obligations and indeed 
possibilities to apply regular international law standards and norms do not exist, 
leaving the Pridnestrovian population lacking in international legal protection. The 
IHL regime would provide a level of protection for the population in certain areas, 
prescribing war crimes such as rape, murder and torture; protecting civilian property; 
and providing an option for the prosecution of alleged violators.19 However, as stated 
above, the level of protection potentially on offer depends on the categorisation of 
the conflict. 
 
International armed conflicts can be defined as ‘situations that involve two or 
more states engaged in armed conflict’. 20  Additional Protocol II  to the Geneva 
Conventions provides a definition of the type of non-international armed conflict to 
which it can apply, as all armed conflicts not covered by Article 1of Protocol I and which  
'take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces of other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol.'21 
 
As can be seen from this definition, the threshold of application of the protocol is 
                                                 
18 See Deirdre Willmott, ‘Removing the distinction between international and non-international 
armed conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, Melbourne Journal of 
International Law (May 2004), available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2004/8.html 
(12 June 2008). 
19 In relation to IHL and the protection offered by it, see Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘International 
humanitarian law and the protection of war victims’, available at: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/html/57JM93 (12 June 2008). 
20 See Mark Freeman, ‘International law and internal armed conflicts: clarifying the interplay 
between human rights and humanitarian protections’, available at: http://www.jha.ac/articles/a059.htm 
(30 January, 2008). Wars of national liberation are also regarded as international armed conflicts if 
these meet the criteria set down in Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
21 Article 1, Additional Protocol II. 
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very high. This means that most non-international armed conflicts will only be dealt 
wi th  by  Common Art ic le  3 ,  which  has  a  lower ,  a l though somewhat  unc lear , 
threshold.22 Common Article 3 can also apply to conflicts that take place between 
two groups on  the ter r i to ry  of  a  High Contrac t ing  Par ty .  The s ta tu te  o f  the 
In t e rn a t ion a l  Cr i min a l  Cou r t  ( I CC)  p r ov id es  an  i n t e r med ia r y  th r es ho ld  o f 
application, whereby there is no longer a requirement for conflict to take place 
between governmental and rebel forces, for the latter to control part of the territory, 
nor for there to be a responsible command. However, the conflict must be protracted 
an d  th e  a r me d  g ro up  mu s t  b e  o r g an i sed . 23  Wi th  r eg a rd  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in 
Pridnestrovie,  i t must be questioned whether Moscow’s activity in the area, as 
out l ined  below,  has  changed the ca tegor isa t ion  of  the confl ic t ,  and thus the 
applicable IHL regime. Intervention can come in many forms, from the presence of 
third-party  mil i tary  consultants ,  to the f inancing of a group that  opposes the 
government to the sending of troops.24  The tests for assessing whether external 
 
intervention internationalises a conflict have been discussed by both the International 
Court  of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal  Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). These cases and involvement tests will now be discussed to 
ascertain the status and categorisation of the Pridnestrovian conflict. The actual 
Pridnestrovian conflict itself was also discussed in a case before the European Court 
o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s  ( E C r t H R ) .  T h i s  c a s e  w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  P a r t  2 . 
 
 
The Nicaragua test 
The first major examination of third-party involvement in a conflict situation and its 
impact on conflict categorisation was in the judgement of the Case concerning 
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) of 27 June 
1986, before the ICJ. In this case, the court examined the involvement of a third state, 
                                                 
22 See Keith Suter, An international law of guerrilla warfare: the global politics of law-making 
(London, 1984), 15. 
23 See Article 8(2)(f) Rome Statute. 
24 The issue of whether intervention internationalises a conflict should be interpreted in light of 
resolution 2625 of the UN General Assembly, ‘Declaration on principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’, (hereafter cited as GA Rea 2625); the text of the resolution is available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement 
(27 March 2008). 
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the United States, in a conflict taking place in Nicaragua. The main focus of this case 
was a determination of whether the United States could be held to be responsible for 
the actions of two agents in the conflict—the Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets 
(UCLAs) and the Contras—and centred on state responsibility. The Court examined 
the activities of the UCLAs, who were totally dependent on the United States, and 
the Contras ,  who maintained a cer ta in  degree of autonomy, though receiving 
payment and equipment from the United States. While the acts committed by the 
first group were found to be attributable to the United States, the issue of the Contras 
was more complex.25 
 
With regard to acts committed by the Contras against the territorial sovereignty 
and poli t ical independence of Nicaragua,  the United States was found to bear 
responsibility because of the support it gave to the Contras; this was a breach of ‘the 
obligations not to intervene in the internal affairs of another state’.26  The Court 
introduced an ‘effective control’ test in order to find that the United States had 
responsibility for ‘acts committed’ by the Contras. In order to satisfy this test it 
would ‘have to be proved that the state had effective control of the military or 
pa rami l i ta ry  opera t ions  in  the  course  o f  which  the  a l leged  v io la t ions  were 
committed’.27 Obviously, this is quite a heavy burden to prove. As the case centred 
on ascertaining whether the Contras consti tuted an organ of the United States 
government or were acting on its behalf,28 it is somewhat different in nature from the 
Pridnestrovian case. However, the Tadiç case, before the ICTY is more similar to the 
Pridnestrovian situation. 
 
The Tadiç test 
The Tadiç case examined the involvement of a third party in a conflict situation, and 
whether such involvement elevated the conflict to one of an international nature. The 
question at issue was whether an armed conflict in Bosnia was of an internal or 
international nature, and thus which IHL regime could be deemed to be applicable. 
                                                 
25 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadiç tests revisited in light of the ICJ judgment on genocide 
in Bosnia’, European Journal of International Law 18 (4) (2007), 649–68: 652. 
26 Cassese, ‘Nicaragua and Tadiç tests revisited?, 652. 
27 International Court of Justice (hereafter cited as ICJ), ‘Military and paramilitary activities in and 
against Nicaragua’ (Nicaragua v United States), Reports of judgments, advisory opinions and orders 
(1984), paragraph 115; available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf, (March 26 2008). 
28 Francis A. Boyle, ‘Determining U.S. responsibility for Contra operations under international law’, 
American Jounral of International Law, 81(1) (1987), 86–93. 
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With regard to the involvement of a third party in a conflict, the Tadiç Appeals 
Chamber Decision stated that: 
  [c]ontrol by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary 
 units may be of an overall character (and must comprise more than the mere 
 provision of financial assistance or military equipment or training). This 
 requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing of specific 
 o r d e r s  by  t h e  S t a t e ,  o r  i t s  d i r ec t i o n  o f  ea ch  i n d iv id u a l  op e ra t i o n . 29 
 
The ICTY also stated that the 
 …control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, 
 in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in 
 organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, 
 in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support 
 to that group.30 
 
However, the judgement goes on to state that: 
 ...if, as in Nicaragua, the controlling State is not the territorial State where the 
 armed clashes occur or where at any rate the armed units perform their acts, more 
 extensive and compelling evidence is required to show that the State is genuinely 
 in control of the units or groups not merely by financing and equipping them, but 
 also by generally directing or helping plan their actions.31 
 
 
The Bosnian genocide case 
The issue of ‘control tests’ was discussed again before the ICJ in 2007, when the 
court dealt with the question of responsibility for the Srebrenica genocide. Having 
decided that events in Srebrenica amounted to genocide, the court then examined the 
question of whether those responsible had acted on behalf of the Former Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY), i.e. if the FRY had control over those who had committed the 
genocide. It returned to the ‘effective control’ test as set out in Nicaragua as, again, 
the main issue to be decided was that of s tate responsibi l i ty .32  In so doing i t 
contrasted the ‘effective control’ test needed in order for ‘FRY’s international 
responsibility’ to be incurred,33 with the ‘overall control test’ used in Tadiç, which 
the  cou r t  cons ide red  ‘may  w e l l  be  su f f i c ien t  to  d e te r mine  i f  a  con f l i c t  i s 
international’.34 
                                                 
29 Tadiç Appeals Chamber Decision, paragraph 137. 
30 Tadiç Appeals Chamber Decision, paragraph 137. 
31 Tadiç Appeals Chamber Decision, paragraph 138. 
32 Cassese, ‘Nicaragua and Tadiç tests revisited’, 650. 
33 ICJ, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment)’, paragraphs 397 and 400; available 
at: http://icj-cij.org (26 March 2008). 
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Which test can be applied to Pridnestrovie? 
As the issue at hand in the Pridnestrovian conflict is whether Russia's involvement 
elevates it to the level of an international conflict, and not a discussion of Russia’s 
responsibility for any acts committed by Pridnestrovian forces, the ‘overall control’ 
test is more suitable and relevant. 
 
It can be seen that the ‘overall control’ test is broader than the ‘effective control’ 
test put forward in Nicaragua and centres not merely on the equipping, financing or 
training of a paramilitary organisation by a state, but also includes state help in or 
co-ordinating of the general planning of the actual paramilitary activities.35 Evidence 
of financing and support by Moscow for the separatists in the Pridnestrovian case is 
deta i led  below,  but  a  nexus  between Moscow and the Pr idnestrovian  regime 
regarding planning and direction needs to be proven in order for the overall control 
test to be satisfied, and thus for the conflict to be elevated to an international armed 
conflict. While it is argued in some quarters that the Pridnestrovian situation is used 
as an instrument of Russian policy in its ‘near abroad’,36 further detailed examination 
of the conflict is necessary in order to ascertain to what extent Moscow was involved 
in planning and directing the Pridnestrovian leadership. This issue is dealt with in 
the discussion of a case before the ECrtHR in Part 2 below. However, before the test 
can  be appl ied ,  a  d iscussion of the  background to  the  confl ic t  is  necessary . 
 
PART 2—THE SITUATION IN PRIDNESTROVIE 
Introduction to Pridnestrovie 
For over fifteen years Pridnestrovie has looked like a state—it has the trappings of 
a state, with an elected government, constitution, flag and currency. It also engages 
in international trade and participates in peace negotiations. In addition, it  has 
maintained de facto control over its territory. However, no third state has recognised 
Pridnestrovie as a state. It is seen internationally as an integral part of Moldova, even 
though Moldova has virtually no control over the region. A situation has arisen 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 ICJ, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, 
paragraphs 402–04. 
35 Cassese, ‘Nicaragua and Tadiç tests revisited', 657. 
36 See, for example, Tony Vaux with Jan Barrett, Conflicting interests. Moldova and the impact of 
Transdniestria (Stonesfield, Oxfordshire, 2003), 7; available at: http://www.humansecurity.org.uk/ 
downloads/MoldovaSCA.pdf (16 October 2008). 
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whereby a de facto regime exists and has ruled over a people and territory for a 
considerable period of time. As it operates at a level below that of a fully recognised 
state, its position in terms of international law is at times confusing and unclear. It 
i s  den ied  r igh t s  g ran ted  to  r ecogn i sed  s t a t e s ,  bu t  i s  a l so  exempt  f ro m the 
responsibil i t ies  that s tates acquire when joining the international community , 
through the signing of treaties and membership of international organisations; thus 
the people l iv ing in the region are denied the protect ion of international  law 
standards.37 
 
However, the European Court of Human Rights found in the case of Ilaflcau that 
‘even in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian region, Moldova 
still has a positive obligation’ to use diplomatic, economic and judicial measures to 
ensure that rights granted by the European Convention on Human Rights are enjoyed 
there,38  thus providing that some international standards should be applied in the 
region. Unfortunately, this does not seem to happen in practice, and Pridnestrovie is 
reportedly a hub for organised crime, including human trafficking and smuggling, 
d u e  t o  t h e  l a c k  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g a l  r e g i m e . 
 
 
A prehistory of the conflict—Moldova as part of the Soviet Union 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldova as it exists today had never 
appeared on any map as an independent and sovereign state. Until 1940 the territory 
had never had a shared administrative structure.39 The area to the west of the river 
Dniester is primarily ethnic Moldovan/Romanian, and was part of Romania in the 
inter-war period. It links itself closely with Romania, and at the time of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union there was much talk of possible reunification with Romania. 
The  in i t i a l  incorpo ra t ion  o f  Moldovan  t e r r i to ry  in to  the  Sov ie t  Un ion  was 
traumatic. There was an active policy of Russification in the region following World 
                                                 
37 With regard to international humanitarian law, this means that Pridnestrovie cannot ratify 
international agreements that regulate the conduct of hostilities and the use of force, such as the Geneva 
Conventions. 
38 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Case of Ilas,cau and Others v Moldova and the Russian 
Federation’, paragraph 331. 
39 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Moldova: no quick fix’, (2003), 2, available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=login&ref_id=1691 (26 March 2008), and 
Rebecca Haynes, ‘Historical introduction’ in Rebecca Haynes (ed.) Occasional Papers in Romanian 
Studies, no. 3: Moldova, Bessarabia, Transnistria, (London, 2003), 1–142: 111. 
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War II. Up to 300,000 Russians were moved to Moldova, mainly to Pridnestrovie 
and urban areas in the rest of Moldova. An estimated 500,000 Moldovans were 
deported to Siberia and the east, and another 200,000 died in famine caused by 
intensive collectivisation.40 Pridnestrovie in 1936 was almost 42% Moldovan, with 
14.2% Russian and 28.7% Ukrainian. By 1989 those figures were 39.3% Moldovan, 
25.5% Russian and 28.3% Ukrainian populations.41 Whereas in 1936 there was an 
almost equal balance between Moldovans and Slavs (Russians and Ukrainians) in the 
region, by 1989 Slavs accounted for  14.5% more of  the total population than 
Modlovans. 
 
Under Soviet rule, Pridnestrovie was built up as an industrial region, while the 
area to the west of the Dniester remained mainly agricultural.42 Moldovans generally 
worked in low-skilled jobs while high-skilled jobs and local positions of power were 
mainly filled by Russian-speakers, creating a perception of discrimination.43Towards 
the end of the 1980s a democratic movement emerged in Moldova, and the Popular 
Front of Moldova (PFM) was formed. In the 1990 elections the PFM performed well 
and was able to form a government with centrist deputies. The Moldovan majority 
took over leadership of the republic, and minorities felt their position might be 
threatened.44 At this time speculation about the unification of Moldova and Romania 
was rife with Romanian President Iliescu stating that unification was ‘historically 
inevitable’.45  Minorities may have felt that their situation could worsen under a 
greater Romania.46 
 
Towards de facto independence for Pridnestrovie and the outbreak of hostilities 
In September 1990 following a similar Gagauz47 proclamation in August, a group of 
                                                 
40 ICG, Moldova: no quick fix, 2. 
41 Marius Vahl and Michael Emerson, ‘Moldova and the Transnistria conflict’, in Bruno Coppieters, 
Michael Emerson, Michel Huysseune, Tamara Kovziridze, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci and 
Marius Vahl (eds) Europeanization and conflict resolution. Case studies from the European Periphery, 
(Gent, 2004), 149–90: 155. 
42 Lukic and Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 358. 
43 William Crowther, ‘The politics of democratisation in post-communist Moldova’, in Karen 
Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova (Cambridge, 1997), 286–95: 286 and Haynes, ‘Historical introduction’, 118. 
44 Crowther, ‘Politics of democratisation in post-communist Moldova’, 292. 
45 Viktor Volodin, ‘IASI conference calls for unification’, Izvestiia, 25 January 1992, (accessed 
through the ‘Current Digest of the Soviet/Post-Soviet Press on CD-Rom’, 2nd edn, 1982–97, 44 (4), 
26 February 26 1992). 
46 Crowther, ‘Politics of democratisation in post-communist Moldova’, 293. 
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deputies wishing to show their loyalty to the Soviet Union declared the formation of 
the Transnistrian People’s Congress and proclaimed the creation of the Soviet 
Socialist Dnestr Republic as part of the Soviet Union.48 The first armed conflict in 
the dispute between Moldova and the breakaway region occurred in the town of 
Dubasari/Dubossary in November 1990.49  In June 1991 the MSSR declared itself 
the Republic of Moldova, a sovereign state within a future confederation of Soviet 
states. However, after the failed Moscow coup of August 1991, Moldova declared 
complete independence on 27 August that year. Both the Gagauz and Pridnestrovie 
r eg ions  suppor ted  the  p ro -Sov ie t  coup .  In  i t s  a f t e rma th  the  l eade rs  o f  the 
Pridnestrovie region stepped up their attempts to take over the institutions of power, 
in what has been described as a ‘creeping putsch’.50 Resistance to this from Moldova 
eventually led to violent conflict in the region in March 1992, and ‘from March 1992 
the conflic t escalated into a full-scale war,  as rocket launchers,  art i l lery , and 
armoured  cars  were  employed’ . 51  A s ta te  o f  emergency  was  declared  by  the 
a u t h o r i t i e s  a n d  t h e r e  w a s  f i g h t i n g  u n t i l  a  c e a s e f i r e  i n  J u l y  1 9 9 2 . 52 
Serious fighting in Pridnestrovie lasted for about five months. There is dispute 
about the exact number of fatalities, but the figure is in the region of several hundred 
to around one thousand deaths; the number of refugees is much greater.53 The main 
fighting took place around the towns of Dubossary and Bendery, both located on the 
border between the breakaway region and the rest of Moldova. On 23 and 24 June 
Izvestiia reported about 400 fatalities in Bendery, with civilians and children among 
the casualties.54 At the peak of the conflict there were an estimated 100,000 refugees 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 The Gagauz are a Turkic minority in the south of Moldova. 
48 OSCE, Transdniestrian conflict: origins and main issues, 2. 
49 Natalia Gherman, ‘Transnistria since 1990 as seen from Chisinau’, in Haynes, Occasional Papers 
in Romanian Studies, no. 3, 181–8: 183. 
50 Vahl and Emerson, ‘Moldova and the Transnistria conflict’, 158. 
51 Pål Kolstø and Andrei Malgin, ‘The Transnistrian Republic: a case of politicized regionalism’, 
Nationalities Papers 26 (1) (1998), 103–28: 110. 
52 Vahl and Emerson, ‘Moldova and the Transnistria Conflict’, 158–9. 
53 Gotfried Hanne and Claus Neukirch, ‘Moldovan schools in Transdniestria: an uphill battle against 
“linguistic cleansing”’, OSCE Magazine, 2005; available at: 
http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2005/07/15621_425_en.pdf (26 March 2008). Hanne and 
Neukirch’s article quotes ‘several hundred’ human casualties and 100,000 refugees. European Court of 
Human Rights, ‘Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia’, Judgement, paragaph 51 (Application 
Number 48787/99), 8 July 2004, also gives this figure. The pro-Pridnestrovian newspaper the Tiraspol 
Times puts the total figure at just over 1,000. See ‘15 years later Pridnestrovie still grieves its war dead’, 




and displaced people,55  and there remain a large number of displaced people in 
Moldova because of the conflict.56 
 
The forces on the Pridnestrovian side were well-organised and armed, and they 
fought under responsible command.57 They were supported by Cossack soldiers who  
had  t r ave l led  f rom Russ ia  th rough  the  Ukra ine  to  f igh t  fo r  P r idnes t rov ie ’ s 
independence.58 Reading accounts by Izvestiia journalists present in the region at the 
time, there can be no doubting that the human cost of the hostilities was high— 
although the conflict did not attract the same attention as conflicts in Transcaucasia 
and also the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, it has inflicted severe damage on 
the region. A ceasefire reached in July was the result of talks between the leaders of 
Russia and Moldova and the consequent signing of the Yeltsin–Snegur Agreement 
on 21 July 1992. The agreement allowed for a security zone and a joint peacekeeping 
force  of  Russ ian ,  Moldovan  and  Pr idnest rov ian  t roops . 59  S ince then ,  severa l 
peace init iatives have been undertaken, but they have not yet led to a lasting 
settlement of the conflict. 
 
The involvement of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation in the conflict 
The main focus of this article is to ascertain whether the involvement of Moscow in 
the Pridnestrovian conflict changed its categorisation, thus, in theory, triggering the 
application of the whole corpus of IHL rather than just Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. The following sections of this 
paper, therefore, contain a description and analysis of the role of the Soviet Union 
and Russian Federation in Pridnestrovie. The 14th Division of the Russian (then 
Soviet) army was based in the area that now constitutes Pridnestrovie during Soviet 
times, with soldiers and officers establishing roots in the region as it became their 
permanent home. In the aftermath of the conflict Russian politicians and leaders 
                                                                                                                                                 
54 See Izvestiia, 23 and 24 June 1992. 
55 Kenneth Roth (ed.), Human Rights Watch world report 1993: events of 1992, (New York, 1992), 
232. 
56 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘Republic of Moldova: uncertainty about the integration 
of displaced from the Transdniestrian region’, March 2004, available at: 
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountrySummaries)/8FA38C0718 
350FB6802570C00056B6D3?OpenDocument&count=10000 (26 March 2008). 
57 See for example Izvestiia, March to June 1992. 
58 Kondratov, ‘Even more victims’, Izvestiia, 3 March, 1992. 
59 Trevor Waters, ‘Security concerns in post-Soviet Moldova: the roots of instability’, in Haynes, 
Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies, no. 3, 189–204: 193–4. 
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made strong statements in favour of Pridnestrovie.60 Some commentators hold the 
view that the conflict situation ‘poisons Moldova’s prosperity and has wider political 
significance because it draws Moldova back within the Russian ambit’.61 However, 
the issue at hand is whether the involvement of a third party raises the conflict to the 
level of an international armed conflict. With that in mind, the information below 
concentrates on the time after Moldova became a fully independent sovereign state 
on 27 August 1991. From this point on, any involvement of a third party in the 
conflict, whether it is the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, has a significance 
in determining if the conflict is international in nature. 
 
Does Moscow’s role amount to third-party involvement? 
While the involvement of Russian troops in the conflict is not disputed, and is detailed 
below, it is not clear in what capacity they were acting. The 14th Division was 
‘embedded’ in Tiraspol and its troops had homes and families there.62 For this reason, 
as Moldova moved towards independence there may have been greater resistance to 
any transfer of power from Moscow to Chisinau among soldiers and officers of the 
14th. Lukic and Lynch state that there was a conspiracy between reactionary pro- 
Soviet politicians in Moscow and the leadership of Pridnestrovie. They claim that the 
military acted on its own to create a fait accompli to which Moscow subsequently 
accommodated itself.63 However, it is difficult to prove this. Looking at Bennouna’s 
statement that a conflict becomes international when ‘an entity is in the services of a 
foreign state with which it shares the same objectives and strategy’,64  it becomes 
necessary to examine whether the objectives of the separatists and the Russian 
F e d e r a t i o n  w e r e  t h e  s a m e .  T h i s  i s s u e  w a s  e l u c i d a t e d  b y  t h e  E C r t H R . 
 
Evidence presented to the ECrtHR 
The case of Ilas,cau and Others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation before the 
ECrtHR involved an in-depth examination of the circumstances around the emergence 
and continued existence of the de facto state of Pridnestrovie.65 The court examined 
                                                 
60 Waters, ‘Security concerns in post-Soviet Moldova’, 197. 
61 Vaux with Barrett, Conflicting interests. Moldova and the impact of Transdniestria, 7. 
62 Crowther, ‘Politics of democratisation in postcommunist Moldova’, 297. 
63 Lukic and Lynh, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, 359–60. 
64 Mohamed Bennouna, ‘The characterisation of the Armed Conflict in the practice of the ICTY’, 
Richard May (ed.), Essays on ICTY procedure and evidence in honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 
(The Hague and London, 2001) 55–64: 64. 
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the issue in order to determine whether Russia’s involvement in the conflict was 
enough to bring the conflict under Russia’s jurisdiction. Any decision on whether 
Russian involvement raises the conflict to the level of international armed conflict 
would need to examine many of the same details outlined by the ECrtHR and consider 
whether this amounted to Russia having ‘a role in organising, coordinating or 
planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training 
and equipping or providing operational support to that group’.66 However, the level 
of activity sought for exercise of jurisdiction is lower than that for control over, or 
involvement in, an armed conflict. The EcrtHR case is the main source of information 
regarding the involvement of Russia in the Pridnestrovian conflict. Only information 
that the court accepted as fact is considered here, as the court explicitly rejected some 
c l a i m s  t h a t  i t  f e l t  h a d  n o t  b e e n  p r o v e n  b e y o n d  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t . 67 
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  a r m s  t h e  c o u r t  s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  c o n s i d e r e d 
i t  to  have  been  es tab l i shed  beyond a  reasonable  doubt  tha t  Transdn ies t r ian 
separatists were able to arm themselves with weapons taken from the stores of 
the 14th Army stationed in Transdniestria. The 14th Army troops chose not to 
oppose the separatists who had come to help themselves from the Army’s stores; 
on the contrary, in many cases they helped the separatists equip themselves by 
hand ing  over  weapons  and  by  open ing  up  the  ammuni t ion  s to res  to  them. 68 
The court also received a statement from a former employee of the general staff of 
the 14th Army’s command and espionage centre,  who ‘had sent the Moldovan 
Ministry of National Security hundreds of documents confirming the participation 
of Russian troops in the armed operations and the massive contribution of weapons 
they had made’ and ‘had also gathered information proving that the separatists’ 
military operations were directed by the 14th Army, which coordinated all its actions 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 It should be noted at the outset that the court examined Russia’s involvement for a quite different 
and specific reason: in order to decide whether Russia could be found responsible for alleged breaches 
of human rights in Pridnestrovie, through its obligations as a States Party to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In considering whether the alleged 
offences came under Russian jurisdiction, the court held that in relation to Article 1 of the Convention 
‘in exceptional circumstances the acts of Contracting States performed outside their territory, or which 
produce effects there, may amount to exercise by them of their jurisdiction’; see ‘Case of Ilaşcau and 
Others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation’, paragraph 314. 
66 The Prosecutor v. Tadiç, Judgment, 15 July 1999, paragraph 137. 
67 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation’, 
paragraph 62. 
68 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 57. 
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with the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation’.69 
 
 
In addition, the court, referring to a book published in 1996 on General Aleksander Lebed, who 
led the 14th Army from June 1992 until then end of May 1995, stated that: 
 …the author, Vladimir Polushin, supplies plentiful evidence, backed up by 
 documentary sources, of the support given by the Russian Federation to the 
 Transdniestrian separatists. The book mentions, for example, the creation by 
 General Lebed of the Russo-Transdniestrian joint defence headquarters and the 
 participation by the 14th Army in the military operations conducted by the 
 Transdniestrian forces against the Moldovan ‘enemy’.70 
 
In particular the ‘destruction of a Moldovan unit by the 14th Army at Chit,cani on 30 
June 1992 and the shelling by the 14th Army of several Moldovan positions between 1 June and 3 
July 1992? are referred to by the applicants and the court.71 
 
While the Russian government claimed that the Russian Federation had remained 
neutral throughout the conflict72 the court referred to 'the abundance and the detailed 
nature of the information in its possession’ from Moldovan witnesses and an OSCE 
repor t ,  de ta i l ing  the involvement  of  the  14th  Divis ion  and later  the  Russ ian 
Operational Group (ROG).73 The court saw ‘no reason to doubt the credibility of the 
Moldovan witnesses heard’ and furthermore added that ‘the support given by the 
troops of the 14th Army to the separatist forces and the massive transfer of arms and 
ammunition from the 14th Army’s stores to the separatists’ made certain that the 
Moldovan forces were in an inferior position and unable to regain control of the 
region.74 
 
It was also stated in the case that on 1 April 1992 the president of the Russian 
Federation placed the 14th Division under Russian jurisdiction, renaming it the 
Russ ian  Opera t iona l  Group  (ROG) . 75  The  fo l lowing  day  Genera l  Ne tkachev,  
the  commander  o f  the  ROG ( the  14 th  Army ) ,  o rdered  the  Moldovan  fo rces  
which  had  encirc led  the  town of  T igh ina  (Bender ) ,  he ld  by  the  separa t is t s ,  
                                                 
69 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 59. 
70 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 61. 
71 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 61. 
72 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 64. 
73 The 14th Division became the Russian Operational Group in Pridnestrovie on 1 April 1992, 
(Paragraph 70). 
74 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 65. 
75 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 70. 
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t o  w i t h d r a w  i m m e d i a t e l y ,  f a i l i n g  w h i c h  t h e  R u s s i a n  a r m y  w o u l d  t a k e 
counter-measures.76 
 
On 5 April Alexander Rutskoy, vice president of the Russian Federation, visited 
Pridnestrovie. According to reports, which the court noted were undisputed by the 
Russian Federation, Rutskoy stated at a public gathering that ‘the 14th Army should 
act as a buffer between the combatants so that the Transdniestrian people could 
o b t a i n  t h e i r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  t h e i r  s o v e r e i g n t y  a n d  w o r k  i n  p e a c e . ’ 77 
 
Examin ing  even ts  a f te r  the  conf l ic t ,  and  whether  Russ ia  had  suppor ted  the 
separatist region, the Russian government submitted a document to the court that 
outlined the compensation that Pridnestrovie would receive for the withdrawal of 
R u s s i a n  m i l i t a r y  e q u i p m e n t  f r o m  P r i d n e s t r o v i e .  T h i s  a m o u n t e d  t o 
a  reduct ion  of  one  hundred mil l ion  United  Sta tes  dol lars  in  i t s  debt  for  gas 
imported from the Russian Federation, and the transfer to it by the ROG, in the 
course of their  withdrawal,  of part of their  equipment capable of being put to 
civilian use.78 
 
According to the commander of the ROG, withdrawals in 2002 ‘had been made 
possible by an agreement with the Transdniestrians under which the Transdniestrian 
au thor i t ies  were  to  receive  hal f  of  the  non-mil i ta ry  equipment  and  suppl ies 
withdrawn’.79 
 
Referring to undated statements, uncontested by other parties, the court heard that 
Alexander Rutskoy, who had been vice-president of the Russian Federation, that he 
supported the ‘legitimacy of the entity created on the left bank of the Dniester’, and 
Yeltsin’s statement that ‘Russia has lent, is lending and will continue to lend its 
economic and political support to the Transdniestrian region’.80 The court also heard 
that ‘on 11 September 1993 General Lebed, the ROG’s commander, was elected a 
member  o f  the  ‘Supreme  Sovie t  o f  the  MRT”’  ( the  Moldav ian  Repub l ic  o f 
Transdnistria – another name for Pridnestrovie).81 
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77 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 75. 
78 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 128. 
79 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Ilaşcau and Others’, paragraph 130. 




Relating to later years, the court heard that the arms trade, described as ‘one of 
the pillars of the Transdniestrian economy’, was directly supported by Russian 
firms.82  I t  also heard of ‘direct relat ions’ between the Russian Federation and 
Pridnestrovie regarding gas exports ,  whereby ‘contrac ts  for  supply ing gas  to 
Moldova do not apply to Transdniestria, to which gas is delivered separately on more 
favourable  f inancia l  terms than  those granted  to  the  res t  of  the  Republic  of 
Moldova’. 83  ‘Pr idnestrovie  also received electr ic i ty  direct ly  from the Russian 
Federation and there was ‘judicial cooperation for the transfer of prisoners between 
the Russian Federation and Transdniestria, without going through the Moldovan 
authorities’.84  Russia claimed that: 
 …[T]he units of the 14th Army had not interfered in the armed conflict between 
 Moldova and Transdniestria, but by virtue of agreements between Moldova and 
 the Russian Federation they had taken on peacekeeping duties and had thus 
 prevented an aggravation of the conflict and an increase in the number of victims 
 among the civilian population,85 and furthermore ‘categorically denied that they  
 exercised, or had exercised in the past, any control whatsoever over Transdniestrian 
 territory and pointed out that the “MRT” had set up its own power structures, including a 
 parliament and a udiciary’.86 However both Moldova and Romania disputed this claim. 
 
The ECrtHR decision 
In light of the support given by Russian troops, the transfer of weapons and the 
public utterances of support by Russian leaders, the court,  in its judgement on 
jurisdiction, considered: 
 ..that the Russian Federation’s responsibility is engaged in respect of the unlawful 
 cts committed by the Transdniestrian separatists, regard being had to the military 
 nd political support it gave them to help them set up the separatist regime and 
 he participation of its military personnel in the fighting. In acting thus, the 
 uthorities of the Russian Federation contributed both militarily and politically to 
 he creation of a separatist regime in the region of Transdniestria, which is part of 
 the territory of the Republic of Moldova.87 
 
The court also noted that even after the ceasefire agreement in July 1992, the Russian 
Federation continued to support the separatist Pridnestrovian regime militarily, 
politically and economically, ‘thus enabling it to survive by strengthening itself and 
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by acquiring a certain amount of autonomy vis-à-vis Moldova’.88) 
 
In  re la t ion  to  th is  de termina t ion ,  par t icu lar  impor tance  was  a t tached  to  the 
‘financial support enjoyed by the “MRT” by virtue of agreements on gas, armaments, 
a m m u n i t i o n ,  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  d e b t s ’ . 89  I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e  c o u r t  h e l d  t h a t : 
 A]ll of the above proves that the ‘MRT’, set up in 1991–92 with the support of 
 he Russian Federation, vested with organs of power and its own administration, 
 emains under the effective authority, or at the very least under the decisive 
 nfluence, of the Russian Federation, and in any event that it survives by virtue of 
 he military, economic, financial and political support given to it by the Russian 
 federation.90 
 
Thus the court drew a very strong link between the Russian Federation and the 
authorities in Tiraspol, speaking of ‘decisive influence’ and even possibly ‘effective 
authority’. 
 
Implications of the Ilascau case on the categorisation of the Pridnestrovian conflict 
An examination of the Pridnestrovian conflict aiming to determine whether Soviet / 
Russian involvement was sufficient to elevate the conflict to one of an international 
nature would look at similar information as the Ilas,cau case,  although with a 
different objective. The objective would be to determine whether the ‘overall control’ 
test criteria were fulfilled, i.e. whether Russia was ‘generally directing or helping 
plan’91 Pridnestrovie’s actions. In light of the Tadiç case discussed above, and given 
such evidence as the direct involvement in the conflict of the ROG, then under 
Russia’s control, when it ordered Moldovan forces to withdraw immediately from an 
area where it had surrounded separatists, along with the ECrtHR’s acceptance of 
other evidence of support given by the Russian Federation to the separatists, this 
leads to the conclusion that Moscow did exert overall control over the separatists. 
Th is  amounted  to  th ird-par ty  involvement ,  thus  e levat ing  the  conf l ic t  to  an 
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From the examinat ion of the facts  of  the  confl ict  and the internat ional  legal 
framework above, it can be concluded that the conflict in the Pridnestrovian region 
was in 1992, and still is, an international armed conflict. The central point in this 
de te rmina t ion  i s  tha t  Moscow’s  ro le  in  the  conf l i c t  amounts  to  th i rd -pa r ty 
involvement, thereby internationalising it. This means that rather than the just the 
basic rules of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the whole corpus of 
IHL should be applicable to the conflict, thus offering a considerably more expansive 
protective regime to those involved in and those caught up in it. The fact that an 
in te rna t iona l  l aw  r eg ime  can  be  deemed  to  be  appl ic ab l e  in  the  reg ion  o f 
Pridnestrovie is all the more significant given the region’s status as a de facto state 
that is unable to ratify international legal instruments. While it is accepted that IHL 
is subject to many criticisms—and particularly salient in this case is the distinction 
between international and non-international armed conflicts—the application of the 
IHL regime could still provide a level of protection for those living in Pridnestrovie 
in relation to torture, rape and other international crimes. However, it is up to the 
actors involved in the conflict to realise the many potential benefits offered by the 
IHL regime and to apply it in practice.92 Unfortunately, this has not yet happened. 
 
 
                                                 
92 It is accepted that recognition of the application of the IHL regime applicable to international 
armed conflicts has political implications, but a discussion of this issue is outside the scope of the 
article. 
